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Abstract: There have been many papers 
which have studied the causes of  conflict, 
taking into account causes like natural re-
sources, ethnicity, political problems, and 
commitment problems, among others. 
This paper focus on the Law of  Universal 
Gravity of  Newton (1687) for trying to see 
if  there could be a neighboring country 
effect on the probability of  a conflict or 
civil war onset and continuity in a given 
country, and the effect of  the size of  
the border, and find significant evidence 
about the distance between countries in 
the probability of  onset a conflict. This 
may suggest that peaceful countries must 
be very careful with the relationships with 
neighbors that are having an armed conflict.
Key words: Civil War, Gravity Model, 
Neighbor Effect, Distance 
Resumen: Existe una cantidad considera-
ble de trabajos que analizan de las causas 
del conflicto. Entre estas causas encontra-
mos los recursos naturales, las diferencias 
étnicas y los problemas políticos, etc. Este 
artículo toma como punto de partida la 
ley universal de la gravedad propuesta por 
Newton (1687), con el fin de identificar 
la existencia de un efecto país vecino y 
un efecto distancia, en la probabilidad de 
que un país pueda entrar en guerra civil o 
tener un conflicto armado. Se demuestra 
que la distancia entre los países juega 
un papel en la probabilidad de entrar en 
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guerra. Concluimos que un país en paz 
debe ser muy cuidadoso en sus relaciones 
diplomáticas con los países vecinos que 
tienen conflictos armados.  
Palabras clave: Guerra Civil, Modelo 
Gravitacional, Efecto Vecino, Efecto 
Distancia.  
Résumé: Il existe un ensemble considé-
rable de travaux qui analysent les causes des 
conflits. Parmi ces causes nous trouvons 
les ressources naturelles, les différences 
ethniques et les problèmes politiques etc. 
Cet article adopte comme point de départ la 
loi universelle de la gravitation proposée par 
Newton (1687), afin d’identifier l’existence 
d’un effet pays-voisin et un effet distance, 
dans la probabilité pour un pays d’entrer 
en guerre civile ou bien d’avoir un conflit 
armé. Nous montrons que la distance entre 
les pays joue un rôle dans la probabilité 
d’entrer en guerre. Nous concluons qu’un 
pays en paix doit être très prudent dans 
ses relations diplomatiques avec ses pays 
voisins qui ont un conflit armé. 
Mots clés: guerre civile, modèle de gra-
vitation, effet pays-voisin, effet distance. 
JEL Classification: F12, D74, C21, C29 
Introduction
Nowadays there are 31 ongoing conflicts 
that are mostly domestic but that have 
been internationalized. The regions with 
the highest frequency of  internal conflicts 
are Asia and Africa, with war as particu-
larity in poorer countries. The arguments 
are clear to understand that economic and 
social prosperity is positively related with 
peace; therefore, those theories where the 
conflicts are established as necessary stages 
for development are doomed to failure.
War leads to mistrust, human, physical 
and social capital are destroyed, there’s 
displacement and migration, there’s no 
entry to foreign capital, investment falls, 
there’s capital outflow, disease propagation 
and misery growth, poverty belts in the 
city are tightened, it scatters population 
and economic activity.
The mostly of  the countries around the 
world have entered in periods of  conflict, 
some more recently and with greater du-
ration, speed and depth than others with 
favorable conditions that make them less 
likely to face them. Conflicts differ by their 
scope within the geographical limits. Some 
of  them are international conflicts, which 
are less frequent, with shorter duration but 
they are more expensives during wartime. 
The other kind of  conflicts are the local 
ones, which have become more frequent and 
have persistence over time (Collier, 2008).
Local conflicts destroy wealth, perpetua-
ting poverty, often with perverse effects 
on economic development. In this sense, 
Collier (2004) has shown that civil wars 
hinder development, and equally, the failure 
in achieving economic goals increases the 
propensity to fall into one of  these wars, 
namely, a vicious trap of  poverty and 
conflict. Even, it has been argued that the 
growth rate of  a country in conflict tends 
to reduce by about 2.2%, this means, that 
in a typical war period of  seven years this 
decrease would reduce by 15% the income 
of  individuals and increase by 30% the 
number of  people living in poverty.
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High-income countries with high econo-
mic performance hardly face a risk of  co-
ming into a conflict. While middle-income 
countries are four times more likely to 
engage into a war. And for those low-
income countries, the reality is frivolous, 
facing a 15 times higher risk of  war than 
high-income countries (Collier, 1999). This 
means that apart from being very poor 
countries depend on natural resources, they 
are uncompetitive, and don’t get into the 
global markets making them even more 
likely to remain in war.
The effects of  local conflicts go beyond 
borders, and of  course, the spread to 
neighboring countries is faster. These are 
the countries that have to take care of  
refugees, combat the spread of  diseases, 
increase military spending for the latent 
threat of  armed groups, feel the shocks 
in trade which ends affecting economic 
growth.
Thus, the overall objective is to determine 
if  there is a neighboring country effect 
on the probability of  a civil war onset in 
a given country, and from the existence 
of  this effect, consider whether there is 
any relationship between the size of  the 
border that joins these two countries and 
the probability of  initiating an internal 
conflict. Given the theoretical implications 
established by the gravity model and the 
fact that there may be different mechanisms 
for transmission at the time of  infection. 
I Problem 
All civil wars contain interdisciplinary 
components related with psychology, the 
complex social and political phenomena 
that leave the strictly economic study. But, 
as stated by Collier and Hoeffler (2006) 
economics provides tools which provide 
information and useful explanation which 
could help to prevent the spread of  in-
dividual situations that undoubtedly fall 
into error in an excess of  highly polarized 
explanation.
Some authors argue that the war could be 
positive because it encourages the country 
to develop high-tech arms industry, and in 
turn, the impact of  war becomes an oppor-
tunity to promote economic development 
and social justice. However, the literature 
agrees that the negative effects of  war on 
growth have a greater impact than what 
these theories argue.
It has been attempted to show the rela-
tionship between conflicts and democracy. 
Generally, the strategy for the promotion 
of  peace is accompanied by a promotion 
of  democracy, and then exist a collective 
ideology positively relating these varia-
bles. However, Collier and Rohner (2007) 
have shown that democracy also limits 
the technical possibilities of  government 
repression, and this makes rebellion easier. 
The authors also show that there is a rela-
tionship between income and democracy, 
and democracy in rich countries makes 
them safer. In this sense, the establishment 
of  a government induced increases in 
military spending in the war to avoid coup 
d’etat (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007).
On the other hand, fragmentation in society 
is important. Civil society is immersed in 
war and the effects are disastrous. Holzman 
(2006) shows that men and women expe-
rience differently conflict and post-conflict, 
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depending on how culture induces gender 
roles. Even the same conflict determines 
the roles of  men and women.
The question that arises is “What is the 
cause of  it?” Without some consensus, 
has been attempted to explain civil war by 
GDP growth rates (not necessary to state 
that growth depends on many variables),by 
inequality and poverty rates, by degrees 
of  social fragmentation or ethnicity, by 
commodities prices, by the dependency 
of  commodities or natural resources, by 
the institutions, by the level of  government 
spending, population growth, political 
involvement. However, the literature agrees 
that the conflict continues while rebel 
groups keep getting funding. 
II. Theoretical framework 
This paper defines civil war as does Collier 
and Hoefler (2004): “an internal conflict 
with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths 
per year. To distinguish civil war from 
massacres, both government forces and 
rebel groups must undergo at least 5% of  
these deaths. As Collier (2004a) civil war 
is considered as a local conflict.
After the Cold War, local conflicts have 
become more frequent. Correcting by per 
capita income, Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
showed that those countries with higher 
ethnic and religious diversity are more 
likely to experience a civil war, and they 
understood civil war as a consequence 
of  violence from guerrillas or insurgents. 
But emphasize that war is not explained 
by ethnic or religious characteristics, but 
the conditions that favor insurgency, sig-
nificantly poverty.
Meanwhile, Dube and Vargas (2013) have 
shown that price shocks in exportable 
goods affect conflict’s intensity. For exam-
ple, for Colombia the authors show that in 
periods where the price of  coffee (labor 
intensive) fell, are precisely the periods 
where the conflict is more pronounced in 
areas where this is cultivated. And when 
oil prices (Intensive capital) rise, conflict 
increases in areas where is produced.
Fearon (2005) and Ross (2004) have found 
a link in the endowment and dependence 
than countries have in natural resources and 
conflict. However, the evidence shows that 
not all natural resources affect conflict, as 
legal agriculture. While energy resources, 
oil type, are essential in the beginning 
of  the conflict, while resources in illegal 
economies are key to the duration of  the 
conflict.
On the other hand, it is not so clear the 
impact that could have the International 
Aids for Development in the conflict. 
Crost, Felter and Honston (2010) and 
Nielsen, R et al (2011) explain that the 
rebel groups could seek funding through 
the resources allocated to development 
projects, this creates an unintended 
consequence because there are restrictive 
effects on the operation of  this programs. 
Otherwise, it is considered that’s not only 
necessary an International Development 
Aid but this must also increase as resources 
become an outlet for the populations most 
vulnerable to conflict.
Now, the literature agrees that failure in 
economic goals makes countries more 
likely to unleash local conflicts. But in 
more specific terms, combining ethnic pro-
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blems, inequality and polarization makes 
the probability of  war even greater. For 
example, Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011) and 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) have 
shown that in the presence of  economic 
inequality, there is a systematic bias towards 
ethnic conflict. Similarly, Fergusson and 
Vargas (2009) confirm this in the case of  
Colombia, and find that inequality impacts 
the conflict in two ways: the gap between 
rich and poor and the dispersion of  wealth 
among these groups.
Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos (2013) 
have considered a new perspective on 
the importance of  the presence of  the 
state over the use of  force, i.e, under the 
theory that an effective government is the 
one who holds the monopoly of  violence. 
The authors show that paramilitary groups 
influence the policies of  the executive and 
the legislative reducing the incentives for 
politicians to eliminate them.
Other variables not so visible could explain 
the cause of  the conflict. Indeed, demogra-
phic growth could influence the unleashing 
of  a local conflict (Acemoglu, Fergusson 
and Johnson, 2012) and the idea is Malthu-
sian suggesting that demographic growth 
increases pressure for scarce resources.
Now the question arises, and it is the 
purpose of  this document corresponds 
to the spatial effects of  the war. That is, 
how a country’s local conflict affects its 
neighbors and what are the odds of  that 
happening. The literature has suggested 
that share borders determine and impinges 
on observable variables such as immigra-
tion or military spending by the threat of  
a neighbor.
Spatial effects on Murdoch and Sandler 
(2004) analyze the impact of  a civil war on 
the growth rates of  the neighbors (nearby, 
not necessarily share a border) in the long 
and short term.
Graph 1 shows the presence of  armed 
conflict around the world in the period 
from 1990 to 2012. Thus, grade 1 countries 
indicate the presence of  conflict from 1 
to 5 years, grade 2 shows those countries 
with 6 to 10 years of  war, while grade 3, 
grade 4 and grade 5 denotes countries that 
experienced from 11 to 15, 16 to 20 , and 
at least 21 years of  conflict respectively. 
Analyzing by regions, the middle east of  
Asia, and Africa shows the highest levels 
of  conflict presence than any other. By 
country, Argelia, Sudan and Ethiopia in 
Africa, India, Myanmar and Afghanistan 
in Asia, and Colombia in South America 
rank among those with the highest grade 
of  conflict. It should be noted that des-
pite countries like United States, have not 
suffered internal conflict itself, the fact 
of  invade other countries to fight wars, 
account to classify them according to the 
UCPD/PRIO parameters1. Furthermore, 
a glance around the world point out some 
clusters regions where conflict seems to 
persist and spread to neighboring countries. 
1 Internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of  a state and one or more 
internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both 
sides.
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Graph 1: Presence of  internal conflict in the world (1990-2012).
Source: Own construction with UCPD/PRIO data. 
The Gravity Equation
Theoretical Fundaments
The gravity equation is commonly used 
for the statistic analysis of  bilateral flows 
between two different components or geo-
graphic entities. Entire theoretical gravity 
model refers to the known Law of  Universal 
Gravitation of  Newton (1687), which holds 
that the attraction between two objects or 
bodies and is given by:
Where:
 Is the attraction force.
 Is a gravity constant.
 y  Represent the masses of  and .
 Is the distance beween and . 
However, Timbergen (1962) proposed 
that this equation could be used not only 
field of  physics, but also to explain tra-
de flows between countries; and since 
that moment, there have been different 
applications to this equation in topics 
like foreign investment, migration and 
tourism. Nevertheless, in this particular 
case, the application would be focused in 
the attraction force that may exist between 
two countries at the moment of  export 
or spread any particular intern conflict to 
some of  its peer countries.
Expressing the last equation in logarithm 
terms, we have: 
The Gravity Equation 
Theoretical Fundaments 
The gravity equation is commonly used for the statistic analysis of bilateral flows between 
two different components or geographic entities. Entire theoretical gravity model refers to 
the known Law of Universal Gravitation of Newton (1687), which holds that the attraction 
between two objects or bodies 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 is given by: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐺𝐺
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2
 
Where: 
𝑭𝑭𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 Is the attraction force. 
𝑮𝑮 Is a gravity constant. 
𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊 𝒚𝒚 𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊 Represent the masses of  𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 Is the distance beween  𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. 
 
However, Timbergen (1962) proposed that this equation could be used not only field of 
physics, but also to explain trade flows between countries; and s ce that moment, there 
have bee  different applications to this equation in topics like foreign investment, migration 
and tourism. Nevertheless, in this particular case, the application would be focused in the 
attraction force that may exist between two countries at the moment of export or spread any 
particular intern conflict to some of its peer countries. 
Expressing the last equation in logarithm terms, we have: 
ln (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = ln(𝐺𝐺) + ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) + ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖) − 2ln (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) 
So, taking into account the above, and 
taking for a basic empirical specification 
which let us see some of  the main causes of  
the conflict found in the literature; given by: 
So, taking into account the above, and taking for a basic empirical specification which let 
us see some of the main causes of the conflict found in the literature; given by: 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Where: 
𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a Dummy variable which is equal to one when country 𝑖𝑖 report an internal conflict at 
the period 𝑡𝑡. 
𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a set of variables identified in the literature as the commonly used in the gravity 
equation models. 
𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is the error term. 
 
Then, combining the two last equations, we derive the empirical structure for the paper: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝛾𝛾 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛿𝛿(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷) ∗ ?̃?𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
In this case: 
𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 Represent the GDP of country 𝑖𝑖.  
?̃?𝑪𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is an intern conflict ongoing in 
country 𝐷𝐷 at moment 𝑡𝑡. 
And 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is given by: 
𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is real GDP of country i in period t, 
 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is the distance between i and j, 
 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j have a common language, 
 
Where:
13Neighborhood effects of civil conflict. (1990 -2012)
 is a Dummy variable which is equal 
to one when country report an internal 
conflict at the period .
 is a set of  variables identified in the 
literature as the commonly used in the 
gravity equation models.
 is the error term. 
Then, combining the two last equations, we 
derive the empirical structure for the paper:
So, taking into account the above, and taking for a basic empirical specification which let 
us see some of the main causes of the conflict found in the literature; given by: 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
Where: 
𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a Dummy variable which is equal to one when country 𝑖𝑖 report an internal conflict at 
the period 𝑡𝑡. 
𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is a set of variables identified in the literature as the commonly used in the gravity 
equation models. 
𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is the error term. 
 
Then, combining the two last equations, we derive the empirical structure for the paper: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝛾𝛾 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − 𝛿𝛿(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷) ∗ ?̃?𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
In this case: 
𝑴𝑴𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 Represent the GDP of country 𝑖𝑖.  
?̃?𝑪𝒋𝒋𝒊𝒊 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is an intern conflict ongoing in 
country 𝐷𝐷 at moment 𝑡𝑡. 
And 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is given by: 
𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 is real GDP of country i in period t, 
 
𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is the distance between i and j, 
 
𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊𝒋𝒋 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j have a common language, 
 
In this case:
 Represent the GDP of  country . 
 is a dummy variabl  which  equal to 
one if  there is an intern conflict ongoing 
in country at moment .
And  is given by:
Y  is real GDP of  country i in period t, 
 is the distance between i and j, 
 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if  
i and j have a common language, 
 is a dummy which is equal to 1 if  
i and j share a land border, 
 is a dummy which is equal to 
1 if  i and j were ever colonies after 1945 
with the same colonizer, 
 is a dummy which is equal to 1 
if  i and j are colonies at time t, 
 is a dummy which is equal 
to 1 if  i and j remained part of  the same 
nation during the sample (e.g., France and 
Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda),  
In this paper, variables and will be the in-
terest variables in the different estimations. 
III. Methodology and data
The paper uses three different sources 
for the data. Data for country conflict is 
taken from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset which is a conflict-year dataset 
with information on armed conflict where 
at least one party is the government of  a 
state in the time period 1946-2011. But 
the paper uses just information for the 
period 1990-2012.
Data for GDP is taken from World De-
velopment Indicators of  the World Bank. 
And data for gravity equation estimations 
(contiguity, distance, common colonizer,) 
are taken from CEPII gravity equations 
database.
All data is merged and reorganized to 
have a data base in a panel data form for 
proceeding by doing the estimations using 
a panel-probit model and a panel-logit 
model. 
IV. Results 
Table 1 shows results of  four different mo-
dels; Equations (1) and (2) correspond to 
panel probit estimations and equations (3) 
and (4) correspond to panel logit estima-
tions. In equations (1) and (3) the variables 
of  interest is the dummy of  neighboring 
country having a civil war (In both cases 
for the period t and the period t-1), and 
for equations (2) and (4) the variables of  
interest are the distance in kilometers mul-
tiplied by the dummy of  conflict (In both 
cases for the period t and the period t-1).
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In general terms, we don’t find any signifi-
cance of  the effect of  a war in period t by 
a neighboring country in the probability of  
having a country in the same period. But in 
the case of  the lagged country, there in both 
kinds estimations there are significance 
evidence of  the effect of  a neighbor’s war 
in period t -1 on the probability of  having a 
war, i.e. If  my neighbor had a war in period 
t-1, the probability that country i have a 
war in period t is positive and significant 
(And if  around 13% and 23%).
For estimations (3) and (4) both variables 
(Distance * Cjt and Distance * Cjt-1) show 
significant coefficients. But the results 
may not be easy to understand. In the case 
of  the lagged conflict, the coefficient is 
negative and significant, which says that 
those countries that had a civil war in t-1 
and are further away doesn’t affect the 
probability of  country i of  having a war, 
but if  those countries are very close, the 
probability increases. However, in the case 
of  the contemporaneous conflict, the co-
efficient is positive and significant, which 
would mean that those closest countries 
that have a civil war in period t decrease 
the probability of  country i to have a civil 
war; and countries which are further away 
increase that probability. An hypothesis that 
may help to understand it maybe the fact 
that mass media could affect the short run 
world conflicts, even in large distances.6
The paper doesn’t study hardly the causes 
of  the main results, nut we may think that it 
could be related to migration problems, si-
milar land conditions, similar development 
states, similar political ideologies and even 
historical reasons like a common colonizer 
and common languages. (In the case of  
countries that had the same colonizer the 
coefficient is both positive and significant).
And, finally, the probability of  having a 
civil war decreases in the case of  large 
levels of  GDP.
2 This is a hypothesis that authors let to other authors that maybe interested.
Table 1
Estimation Results.
Dependent variable: 
(Conflict in country i)
(1)
Panel Probit
b/se
(2)
Panel Probit
b/se
(3)
Panel Logit
b/se
(4)
Panel Logit
b/se
1 for common official of  -0.023 -0.023 -0.027 -0.027
primary language (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
1 for pairs ever in 1.059*** 1.067*** 2.082*** 2.095***
colonial relationship (0.20) (0.20) (0.38) (0.38)
1 for common colonizer -0.347*** -0.347*** -0.656*** -0.655***
post 1945 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
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Dependent variable: 
(Conflict in country i)
(1)
Panel Probit
b/se
(2)
Panel Probit
b/se
(3)
Panel Logit
b/se
(4)
Panel Logit
b/se
1 for pairs currently in -0.844* -0.852* -1.622 -1.634*
colonial relationship (0.49) (0.49) (0.99) (0.99)
1 for pairs in colonial -0.204 -0.209 -0.442 -0.449
relationship post 1945 (0.25) (0.25) (0.47) (0.47)
1 if  countries were or 0.192 0.202 0.391 0.407
are the same country (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.25)
Ln (GDP) -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.270*** -0.270***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
1 if  a Neighbor is having 0.029 0.031
a conflict in period t (0.07) (0.13)
1 if  a Neighbor is having 0.137* 0.234*
a conflict in period t -1. (0.07) (0.13)
Distance * Cjt 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.00) (0.00)
Distance * Cjt-1 -0.010*** -0.015***
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.139* 0.139* 0.306** 0.310**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.15)
lnsig2u
Constant 2.089*** 2.088*** 3.311*** 3.311***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 848034 848034 848034 848034
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
V. Conclutions
According to the Newton’s gravity law, 
an exercise applied to the probability of  
the onset of  conflict in any country at a 
period t, knowing that in the same moment 
one of  its neighbors is having a internal 
conflict, there is significant evidence of  
having an internal conflict when any of  
the country’s neighbor had a conflict in the 
last year. Additionally, there are ambiguous 
interpretations in the case of  distance. But 
it’s important to note that the probability 
of  having a war increases if  any neighbor 
which is very close had a civil war in the 
last year.
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Then, there is a neighboring country 
effect on the probability of  a civil war 
onset in a given country that depends 
of  the distance. However, given the 
theoretical implications established by 
the gravity model, there may be diffe-
rent mechanisms for transmission at 
the time of  infection. And this paper 
doesn’t focus on that, but it could be 
very interesting to try to identify the 
transmission channels.
Although, according to the conclusions 
of  the model, it would suggest, in terms 
of  political economy, that the State of  any 
nations which has a neighbor that is having 
a civil conflict, must be very careful with 
his population, and with the relationship 
with the neighbor country. 
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